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NSA review completed

External Reviews of the Intelligence Community

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External Reviews of the Intelligence Community

Summary

This compilation of 28 surveys, investigations and studies concerning the intelligence community includes only those directed and carried out by authorities external to the intelligence community. They range in time from 1948 to the present, in magnitude of effort from one-man studies to major Government commissions, and in scope from single agencies or departments to the entire intelligence community.

Not included in this listing are an equal or greater number of studies and surveys carried out wholly within the intelligence community or within individual agencies. These generally were intended to be self-examinations of major systems, functions or organizations for purposes of making improvements.

The principal observation enabled by a review of the actions reported is that the intelligence community, in whole or in part, has been the subject of almost continuous study, review and oversight by elements of Congress and the Executive Branch ever since the current community structure started evolving after World War II.

Added to these efforts are other audits, hearings, and testimonies far too numerous to mention over the same time span, and involving at one time or another all elements and organizations within the intelligence community.

The entry in parentheses at the end of each item represents the custodian of the report.

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Report of the U. S. Commission  
on the Organization of the  
Executive Branch of the Government - 1947-49

(The Hoover Commission Report)

Prepared by a Presidential-Congressional Commission created by the Congress in July 1947. The Report ranged across the entire Executive Branch. What little space was specifically devoted to intelligence is under "The National Security Organization" chapter. It calls for more effective relations between the JCS, on the one hand, and the NSC, CIA, R&D Board, Munitions Board and National Security Resources Board on the other. It also called for vigorous steps to improve the CIA and its work (the CIA was barely established then) by more flexible use of military personnel.

(Open literature)

The Administration of Intelligence  
in the Department of State - 15 May 1952

(The Cresap-McCormick-Paget Report)

Prepared by the management engineering firm of Cresap, McCormick and Paget under a State Department contract with the Center for International Studies of MIT. The Report found that intelligence in the State Department was vigorous and had been strengthened over the past seven years since 1945. It recommended improvements in consumer relations, the use of research analysts, planning for simplification of operations, and some refinements in organizational structure -- all in all a total of 35 specific changes. Considerable emphasis was given to consumer relations with a recommendation to designate a Consumer Relations Coordinator to perform "market research" and evaluate the adequacy of INR's responses to the "market." (State)

Survey on Communications Intelligence Activities  
of the U. S. Government - 13 June 1952

(The Brownell Report)

Prepared by the Brownell Committee appointed by the Secretaries of State and Defense on 28 December 1951 to survey departmental and national needs for communications intelligence. The Committee also surveyed the allocation of responsibility and authority for the conduct of communications intelligence as a service of common concern. It recommended a true unification of the separate communications intelligence activities of the Military Services into a national agency under the Secretary of Defense. The National Security Agency was established as a result of this study.

(NSA)

The Clark Task Force Report  
of the Hoover Commission on Intelligence Activities - June 1955

(The Second Hoover Commission Report)  
(The Clark Report)

Prepared by a group under General Mark Clark as one of a number of task forces of the Second Hoover Commission. The major recommendations of the Report dealt with internal reorganization of CIA; establishment of a Presidential watchdog committee on intelligence with prominent citizens and members of Congress and a Joint Congressional Committee on Foreign Intelligence; greater use of military personnel by CIA; more frequent security checks on personnel; transfer of foreign publications procurement and scientific intelligence reporting from State to CIA; construction of a new CIA building; and expansion of foreign language training. ✓

(This report and the Joint Study Group Report of 1960 seem to have had the greatest impacts on the community prior to the Schlesinger Report of 1971.) (State)

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Scientific Judgments on Foreign Communications Intelligence  
by the Special Intelligence Panel of the  
President's Scientific Advisory Committee - 23 January 1958

(The Baker Report)

Undertaken by a group headed by Dr. William O. Baker of Bell Laboratories to look into technical aspects of the NSA cryptanalytic effort. The highly favorable report given on the skills and advanced technology of the attack on ciphers was materiel in preserving the funding of the work at a time when there was considerable pressure to divert resources to other SIGINT tasks. (NSA)

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The Joint Study Group Report  
on Foreign Intelligence Activities  
of the U. S. Government - 15 December 1960

(The Joint Study Group Report)

An across the board review of the entire intelligence community of the time, with particular emphasis on Defense intelligence activities. It recommended strengthening the JCS, recently elevated by the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, as a way to reduce the fragmentation of intelligence among the three Military Services, and this suggestion is considered to have been the origin of the Defense Intelligence Agency. It also called for a stronger coordinating role for the Director of Central Intelligence, backed by a truly inter-agency community staff. (CIA)



Report of the President's Committee  
on Information Activities Abroad - December 1960

(The Sprague Report)

Dealt only peripherally with intelligence activities, concentrating instead on the "battle for men's minds." The Committee was set up by President Eisenhower in December 1959 to review the 1953 report of the Committee on International Information Activities and recommend revisions of U. S. information programs to meet the current cold war situation. Among other things, it called for stepping up 25X1C and the 25X1C4C Radio in the American Sector (of Berlin) and for increased operations 25X1C Southeast Asia, Latin America and Africa. (NSC Staff)

Report of the President's Commission  
on the Assassination of President Kennedy - 1964

(The Warren Commission Report)

Inter alia, a strong criticism that the liaison between the Secret Service and intelligence-gathering agencies was too casual, particularly with the FBI and CIA which carried a major responsibility for information about potential threats arising from organized groups within their special jurisdictions. As a result, the Secret Service reorganized its intelligence handling, formulated standards for the collection of information and set up agreements with each Federal agency that might be able to supply information bearing on Secret Service responsibilities. The volume of information resulting has required the Secret Service to automate its information handling and to secure help from the scientific community in defining violent behavior that might be aimed at those the Secret Service protects.

(Secret Service)

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
A Review of Selected NSA  
Cryptanalytic Efforts - 18 February 1965

(The Bissell Report)

A virtually one-man study conducted by Richard M. Bissell after leaving CIA. He examined prospects for success and levels of effort in the attack on Soviet high-grade ciphers seven years after the Baker Report. It found that technology had begun shifting

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(NSA)

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The Report of the House Appropriations Committee  
Investigation of the Defense Intelligence Agency - 27 February 1965

(The HACIT Report of 1965)

The result of the Committee Staff investigation of DIA between May 1964 and February 1965 to: examine the extent to which the establishment of DIA had eliminated redundancy in Defense intelligence activities; review the military and civilian grade structure of DIA; and identify management and operational improvements resulting from DIA's establishment. The report was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense in June and his reply went to the Committee in October 1965. (House Appropriations Committee)

The Foreign Affairs Information  
Management Effort - 10 May 1965

(The FAIME Report)

Prepared by Dunlap and Associates for the Bureau of the Budget in examining the information handling practices of State, AID, USIA, and ACDA. The Report found no program for the development of an integrated reporting system for all foreign affairs information and no common classification system for that information. As to the State Department, the Report called for greater readiness to use modern information handling methods, greater feedback from top management as to its information needs and a centrally managed information system including both development and day-to-day use. (State)

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Report on Strategic Warning - 27 February 1967

(The Shute Report)

This study was commissioned by President Kennedy in 1963 to review all activities of the intelligence community bearing on strategic warning with a view to bringing the warning process up to date, taking advantage of new collection and processing systems, and planning for still newer systems then under development, especially in the area of overhead reconnaissance. The study was headed by Benjamin R. Shute, a New York lawyer, who was assisted by representatives of the major intelligence agencies. (CIA)

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Report of the Guidance  
and Evaluation Panel - February 1967

(The Knox Panel Report)

A year-long study of information handling within the intelligence community in response to a Presidential directive recommended by PFIAB and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. The study was inspired by the "information explosion" of the period and the difficulties encountered by the community in dealing with the volumes of information generated by new collection technology. The Panel found that the community had failed to exploit modern information technology and recommended that the President direct the establishment of a unified intelligence information system under the guidance of the DCI, supported by a new staff separate from CIA. (PFIAB)

The Katzenbach Report - 24 March 1967

Occasioned by the Ramparts revelations of the relations between CIA and the National Students Administration and conducted by Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Richard Helms, and John W. Gardner. This report strongly recommended against Government association with educational and private organizations operating abroad and urged establishing an American adaptation of the quasi-public British Council. The report also contains an excellent history of the evolution of mechanisms to review and control covert action operations. (NSC Staff)



The House Appropriations Committee  
Investigative Team Report - March 1968

(The HACIT Report)

This investigation was focused entirely on DIA and was strongly critical of that organization's failure to accomplish what was expected when it was established in 1961. The investigation found that Defense intelligence activities continued to be fragmented among the Military Service intelligence agencies, which had nearly doubled in personnel since 1964, and which appeared to be acting as subcontractors for DIA-directed production. No recommendations were made, however, as to ways to strengthen DIA vis-a-vis the Services. (House Appropriations Committee Staff)

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The DCI Special Study Group Report - 16 August 1968

(The Eaton Report)

Prepared by a panel composed of Frederick M. Eaton of Sherman and Sterling, General Norstad, Ambassador Merchant, and Dr. Fubini of IBM pursuant to a Presidential order to review SIGINT activities of the U. S. Government which had reached unprecedented size and expense by Fiscal Year 1968. The group also examined the wide differences between JCS and NSA over control of certain tactical or quasi-tactical SIGINT resources and recommended that those used for tactical support be budget outside the intelligence budgets and be controlled by the tactical commander as another force element. It also called for a strong control at the Secretary of Defense level over Defense intelligence and for a true community staff for the DCI. (CIA)

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Report on Defense Intelligence - 29 July 1968

(The Froehlke Report)

Prepared for the Secretary of Defense by Robert F. Froehlke, Assistant Secretary of Defense/Administration, in continuation of recommendations in the Eaton Report for stronger, more authoritative management of Defense intelligence resources and activities. It recommended establishing a Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense as the focal point of intelligence control, a position which Mr. Froehlke filled for a time as an additional responsibility. (ASD/I)

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Covert Operations  
of the U. S. Government - 1 December 1968

(The Lindsay Report)

Prepared by a distinguished private and Government group headed by Frank A. Lindsay of ITEK to brief the incoming President on covert operations on the Clandestine Services. The report argued persuasively against proposals to separate Clandestine Services intelligence collection from covert action and to remove the Clandestine Services from CIA. It called instead for increased clandestinity by the Agency, noting that CIA was often obliged in assisting other departments to undertake risks of disclosure greater than prudent. (Frank Lindsay)

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Report on National Command  
and Control Capability and Defense Intelligence - 1 July 1970

(The Fitzhugh Report)

Prepared as one of the studies by a Blue Ribbon Panel on the Defense Department, headed by Gilbert W. Fitzhugh. The report echoed the Froehlke Report on the fragmented state of Defense intelligence and called for a strong central authority in Defense, greater consumer feedback for more efficient direction of intelligence collection and production and the consolidation of several functions, such as counterintelligence being conducted separately by the Military Services. It effectively established the authority of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Intelligence, now Dr. Hall, and foreshadowed a number of the recommendations of the Schlesinger Report. (ASD/I)

A Review of the Intelligence Community - 10 March 1971

(The Schlesinger Report)

Prepared by Dr. Schlesinger of OMB for the President, this report formed the basis of President Nixon's directive of 5 November 1971. The report recommended establishment of the DCI as the leader of the community in resource matters as well as in substance, urged stronger central management of Defense intelligence resources, called for establishment of the NSC Intelligence Committee and the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, called for a true Intelligence Community Staff, recommended that improvement of the intelligence product should be a matter of the highest priority. (OMB)

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board  
Report to the President - 15 December 1971

(The PFIAB Economic Intelligence Report)

Prepared by PFIAB in response to President Nixon's directive of 4 June 1971 to make recommendations on the collection and dissemination of economic intelligence. The report was the first major survey of the U. S. economic intelligence effort, at least since 1960. It found that responsibility for fiscal, monetary and trade matters was fragmented among Government agencies and that the supporting intelligence effort had suffered disproportionately large reductions in recent years. It recommended that economic intelligence be considered an essential element in national security policy and urged the DCI to take the lead in formulating a broad concept of economic intelligence and resources devoted to it. (PFIAB)



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(The Lehan Study)

Requested by Dr. Foster, DOD/DDR&E, on behalf of the Defense Science Board, as an analysis of technical intelligence systems and their contribution to tactical operations. The study group was chaired by Mr. Frank Lehan and gave particular attention to systems found to be receiving insufficient support. A result of the study was that certain systems had their funding increased four-fold. Most of the systems studied were ELINT systems operated by NSA and the Military Services. (DDR&E)

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Report of the Ervin Subcommittee  
on Constitutional Rights, Senate Judiciary Committee - 1973

(The Ervin Committee Report)

Prepared by the Ervin Committee which was formed in 1970 to inquire into allegations of U. S. Army intelligence investigations of U. S. citizens. Based on hearings held during 1971 and 1972, at which the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Administration (Mr. Froehlke) testified for the Department of Defense, a report, "Military Surveillance of Civilian Politics," was issued in 1973. This report led Senator Ervin to introduce legislation to prohibit such activities by military intelligence. Although this bill was never reported out of committee, identical legislation, the "Freedom from Military Surveillance Act of 1975," has been introduced in the Senate (Senator Matthias) and in the House (Mr. Kastenmeier). (Senate Judiciary Committee)

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U. S. Human Source Intelligence:  
Report by PFIAB - February 1973

(The PFIAB HUMINT Report)

Initiated by Presidential request in May 1972 to look into the roles played by human sources intelligence. The report found that the Foreign Service could make a far greater contribution and thus relieve the Clandestine Services, that the Defense Attache System needed better career development and training, that FBI Legal Attaches were under-used as sources and that all human intelligence suffered from a lack of national over-all direction and planning.

(PFIAB)

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A Report on Economic Intelligence - 7 December 1973

(The Cherne Report)

Submitted by Leo Cherne under PFIAB auspices as an update to the 15 December 1971 PFIAB report on economic intelligence. The report contained numerous substantive observations on international economic affairs of the time and commented on the lack of effort in economic intelligence forecasts, the over-classification of much of economic intelligence production and little user feedback for guidance. It urged resolution of disparate CIA views on economic matters and greater use of SIGINT as a source for economic intelligence. (PFIAB)

A supplement to this report exists as a statement by Mr. Cherne to PFIAB on 4 October 1974.

The Commission on the Organization of the Government  
for the Conduct of Foreign Policy -- report due 1 July 1975

(The Murphy Commission)

A joint Presidential-Congressional study commission established by the Foreign Relations Act of 1972. It is to submit to the President and the Congress findings and recommendations "to provide a more effective system for the formulation and implementation of the nation's foreign policy." The Commission may make recommendations with respect to the reorganization of the departments and agencies, more effective arrangements between the Executive Branch and Congress, improved procedures among departments and agencies, the abolition of unnecessary services and functions, and other measures to promote economy, efficiency, and improved administration of foreign policy. The Commission is divided into four Committees: Congressional (Senator Mansfield, Chairman), National Security/Intelligence (Ambassador Murphy, Chairman), International Economics (Senator Pearson, Chairman), and Public Diplomacy and Support (Congressman Zablocki, Chairman). The Commission's mandate expires on 30 June 1975. Among the subjects under study by the Commission are the relationship between intelligence and the policy-maker, resource allocation in the Intelligence Community, the

authorities for the conduct of intelligence, and the desirability of maintaining a capacity for the conduct of covert action.

General Accounting Office Review of FBI Activities - 1975

Conducted by direction of the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee to review FBI domestic intelligence operations, policies, programs, procedures and case management. The audit, still in progress, will cover FBI Headquarters and ten field offices.

(House Judiciary Committee)